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Dear Dr. Ring: 
 
Thank you for sending me the FEE paper entitled: The conceptual 
approach to protecting auditor independence.  Your document goes 
much further than our conceptual framework exposure draft because in 
certain respects it has different objectives.  For example, your 
document discusses education and enforcement procedures and the role 
of government bodies and professional societies within a unique multi-
cultural environment.  My comments below relate to the issues within 
the scope of our ED. 
 
I agree fully with the thrust of your document – that a conceptual 
approach to independence is most effective, because it allows auditors 
and others to evaluate actions and activities against established criteria 
and objectives.  I would not, however, describe our conceptual 
framework as “intended to provide a basis for evaluating rule-based 
systems.”  Rather, the framework is intended to be the underlying 
rationale for independence standards that the ISB will develop from 
time to time.  Those standards will identify threats to independence and 
provide guidance on appropriate safeguards, including prohibitions, in 
areas where acceptable practice is unclear or existing practice should be 
improved.  Furthermore, it would not be appropriate to describe such 
standards as rule-based as you define the term – “black and white 
requirements [that] leave no room for misunderstanding or evasion 
…[but] that can be evaded through arrangements that adhere to the 
letter but offend against the spirit.”  Certainly the combination of a 
conceptual framework and a set of principles-based standards should 
not permit the tortured logic in the Australia example in your paper.  
Furthermore, the whole purpose of a principles-based standard is to 
“require auditors to consider actively, and to be ready to demonstrate 
the efficacy of, arrangements for safeguarding independence.”  And 
when combined with an appearance test, the safeguards specified must 
be viewed as “illustrative and not comprehensive.” 
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The ISB conceptual framework also is intended to help others, in 
addition to the ISB and auditors – such as audit committees, company 
executives, and regulators – both to understand the objectives of auditor 
independence and to aid them in crafting solutions (safeguards) in 
situations not covered by ISB standards. 
 
Finally, I must note that an independence regime that puts all the 
responsibility on the auditor, but with few specifics, is risky.  I agree 
completely with your highlighting the importance of firm culture in 
preserving independence and I recognize the stake a firm has in 
protecting its reputation.  One of the threats to independence, however, 
is self-interest, and this threat could subconsciously bias professional 
judgments even when the auditor consciously believes he or she is 
acting in accordance with the highest professional standards.  Further, a 
firm may have a clear incentive to adopt the least restrictive safeguards.  
That is likely to be the case when more restrictive safeguards would 
result in either declining an audit client appointment or a non-audit 
service assignment, terminating a partner or staff member, disposing of 
a financial interest, or avoiding a business relationship.  Furthermore, a 
peer review system to detect independence problems may be helpful, 
but it is not likely to uncover many of them.  There is also the risk that 
the peer review practitioner, because of the same self-interest bias, will 
rationalize even the problems that are identified.  That is why in some 
cases the ISB is likely to be specific when requiring safeguards, 
including prohibitions. 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
Your paper is an important contribution to the independence literature; 
I hope you find these comments of the ISB staff helpful.  Please note 
that they do not purport to represent the views of the ISB Board itself, 
which has not considered these matters. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Arthur Siegel 
Executive Director 
 
 
